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COMMENTS

the constitutionality of a court is the place of its inception, not the source
of its power, at least so far as New York is concerned. Whether we agree
with this postulate is of no avail. It is the adjective law of this state. Yet
we find the same tribunal that set forth this standard of demarcation using
a different test in determining the constitutionality of a legislative body. In
People ex rel. Deitz v. Hogan 5 it was held that the Board of Mdermen of
the City of New York was a constitutional body not because it was created
in the Constitution, which it assuredly was not, but because it was vested
with the legislative power to create Assembly districts out of Senatorial
districts.30 Thus the test of the constitutionality of a body was shifted from
the source of its inception to the source of a particular power. I leave it to
others to harmonize these two conflicting approaches to the answer to the
same question.
This, at least, can be maintained. If the reasoning employed in the Dcilz
case was the rationale of the Haggerty case it is obvious that the Municipal
Court of the City of New York would be held to be a constitutional court
for, as the writer sees it, such is the philosophic background of the Ancrican
Insurance case.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN NEW YORK AS AFFECTING CON.
TRACTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF CO1 1ISSIONS
A number of recent New York decisions have created some doubts as to the
effect of the Statute of Frauds on certain types of employer-employee contracts, particularly those relating to the payment of commissions. A review
of the cases in the light of their historical background will not entirely resolve
the doubts, but it may serve at least to outline an area in which inconsistencies appear.
The section of the New York Statute with which we are concerned' is as
follows:
"Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking:
"1. By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the ma1ing thereof
or the performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime . ..

The Historical Backgrotad
This section stems directly from the corresponding portion of the original
Statute of Frauds2 except for the last sixteen words quoted, which bring life35.

214 N. Y. 216, 222, 10S N. E. 459, 463 (1915).

36. N. Y. Coxsr., Art.

m, § 5.

i. N. I. Pans. Prop. L.w § 31(1).
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time contracts within the purview3 of the statute. These words were added
to the New York statute in 19334 as part of a series of enactments designed
to prevent the assertion of oral claims against the estates of deceased persons when the person alleged to have made the oral agreement could no longer
testify regarding it. The "lifetime" mentioned has been construed as meaning that of the promisor, (that is, in employment cases, the employer) and it
includes agreements to pay for services actually rendered by the employee
where payment in whole or in part is postponed beyond the death of the employer.7 The ordinary agreement for the payment of commissions therefore
falls outside the scope of this clause. Circumstances calling for its application to such an agreement are not inconceivable, but no cases on the point
appear as yet to have been reported.8
The main portion of the statute we are considering has a long judicial history, without knowledge of which no understanding of it can be complete. The
English courts early decided that an agreement which might, in accordance
with the expressed intention of the parties, be performed within a year, is not
within the statute notwithstanding that there may be a possibility that per-

formance will take longer than a yearY This interpretation was well recognized
long before the Revolution, and was taken into American law by those states
which adopted the statute, or one similar to it, as their own.", Nor is it fatal

that performance within a year was not expected by either party; the statute
2. 29 Charles II, c. 3 (1677).
3. Despite the use of the word "void" in the statute itself, contracts covered by the
statute are, by judicial interpretation, not void but merely unenforceable. It has been
said that a right of action against either or both parties to the contract is denied while
the requirements of the statute are not complied with. 1 WumsToN, CoNmTRACs (rev. ed.
1936) § 16. But even this is too strong a statement. The right of action Is not denied.
In general, the statute will not serve as a bar unless pleaded. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y.
538, 548? 27 N. E. 256, 258 (1891) ; Duffy v. O'Donovan, 46 N. Y. 223, 226 (1871). But see
Booker v. Heffner, 95 App. Div. 84, 88 N. Y. Supp. 499 (2d Dep't 1904).
4. C. 616, N. Y. Laws 1933. The amendment became effective on April 29, 1933.
5. In re Keeler's Estate, 186 Misc. 20, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 61 (Surr. Ct. 1945); In rc
Block's Estate, 258 App. Div., 342, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 674 (1st Dep't 1940).
6. Bayreuther v. LaGuardia, 176 Misc. 547, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 620 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
7. In re Ditson's Estate, 177 Misc. 648, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 468 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
8. The lifetime clause does not apply to any agreements made before its effective date.
Wahl v. Seyfried, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 653 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 260 App, Div. 993, 25
N. Y. S. (2d) 656 (4th Dep't 1940), aff'd, 285 N. Y. 820, 35 N. E. (2d) 496 (1941).
9. Peter v. Compton, Skinn. 353, 90 Eng. Rep. 157 (K. B. 1694), involved an exchange of one guinea in praesenti for the pr6mise of a certain sum on the day of the
*roinisor's wedding. The agreement was held not to be within the statute. It Is well settled that mere "unlikelihood of performance within a year does not make a verbal contract unenforceable.
10. ". . . where English statutes, such . . . as the statute of frauds, . . . have been
adopted into our own legislation, the known and settled construction of those statutes
. . . has been considered . . . as silently incorporated into the acts . . ." Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 14 (U. S. 1829).
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applies only to an agreement ".... which, by a fair and reasonable interpretation of the terms used by the parties, and in view of all the circumstances
existing at the time, does not admit of performance according to its language
and intention, within a year from the time of its making."'" This statement,
which is reinforced by the most authoritative expressions of thought on the
subject, 12 is worthy of careful notice. It does not say that any possibility of
performance within a year takes the contract out of the statute. The possibility must lie within the general scope of the agreement. 13 If performance
within a year, though physically possible, would be totally outside that design
which is to be inferred from the words and circumstances of the agreement,
the contract is not free of the statute.
This line of thought is clearly illustrated by the leading English case of
Boydell v. Druammond.14 Defendant orally agreed to buy a series of eighteen
prints which plaintiff was to publish at the rate of at least one and probably
two per year. The contract was held unenforceable under the statute. Though
it was within the bounds of physical possibility for all eighteen prints to be
published within a year, the court held that the seller could not, within a
fair interpretation of the contract, force the prints, and liability for payment,
upon the buyer within a year. On the other hand, a contract may be capable
of indefinite continuance and still be outside the statute. For this to be so,
the possibility of performance within a year must exist and be consistent with
the agreement. Performance within a year need not be probable in any mathematical sense. An oral contract to insure property for a five-year term to
commence within a year of the making of the contract is enforceable, since the
insurance may become payable at any time after the beginning of the term. 5
11.

BROwNE, THE STATUTE OF FRAUDs (5th ed. 1S95)

§ 273.

12. Warner v. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co., 164 U. S. 413 (1396).
13. But see REST.TEmENT, CoNTa-cTs (1932) § 193, Illust. 5 for an example of the extremity to which the "general scope" of the contract can be stretched. It has to do with
a timber-cutting contract which may last five years and which neither party expects can
be performed within several years, nor can it be performed in less time if the timber is
cut in the way that both parties expecL The Restatement concludes, however, that it is
performable within a year within the meaning of the statute because by installation of
other methods and the employment of numerous men, the timber might all be cut in
less than a year. None of the New York cases appear to go so far. The Englizh courts
clearly take a more moderate view. Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East 142, 103 Eng. Rep.

958 (K. B. 1S09).
14.

11 East 142, 103 Eng. Rep. 95

(K. B. 1309). The case is mentioned

in S

Wnxas-

ToN, Com.cTs (rev. ed. 1936) § 500, where there is an excellent dicus sion of the effect
of the statute on contracts which, though not intended or expected to be performed within
a year, are nevertheless conceivably capable of such performance.
15. "If it can be performed consistently with the language in which the parties have
expressed themselves, in other words, if the obligation of the contract is not, by its very
terms or necessary construction, to endure for a longer period than one year, it is a valid
agreement, although it may be capable of an indefinite continuance." Trustees of the
First Baptist Church v. Brooklyn Fire Insurance Co., 19 N. Y. 305, 307 (1359).
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That the time of performance is uncertain, and that it may probably extend,
and may have been expected by the parties to extend, beyond a year, is not
enough to bring it within the statute.

On similar reasoning, employment contracts which by their terms are to
end with the death of the employee are enforceable though oral. 10 And until
the enactment in 1933 of the "lifetime" clause discussed above, the same
17
applied to contracts measured in duration by the life of the employer. Similar in intent to the "lifetime" contracts are the contracts for "permanent employment". Whether these are viewed as lifetime .contracts"s or as contracts
for hiring for an indefinite period, 19 they are enforceable2 0 though oral.
It may be thought, because all personal service employment contracts end
if the employee dies, that they are therefore performable within a year and
hence outside the statute. Such is far from the case. The form in which the
parties expressed themselves, as well as the substance of a contract, must decide its validity.2 ' Williston 22 uses four examples of employment contracts to

illustrate the hair-breadth fineness of the distinctions which may be necessary:
"1.
2.
16.

A promise to serve two years;
A promise to serve as long as the employee lives, not exceeding two years;
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

(1932)

§ 198, Illust. 2.

17. The New York Statute of Frauds does not include an agreement uncertain as to
time and which may consistently with its terms be performed within a year although It
is not probable or expected that it will be, such as a parol agreement for work and labor
to be paid for at the death of the employer. Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 560 (1875). Such
agreements, however, were carefully scrutinized by the courts because ". . . the peril of
perjury and error is latent in the spoken promise." Cardozo, J., in Burns v. McCormick,
233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922). The oral contract in the latter case was held unenforceable because it involved a transfer of real property.
18. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 496.
19. "A contract for permanent employment, 'in the ibsence of express or implied stipulations as to its duration, or of a good consideration additional to the rendering of services contracted for is no more than an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of
either party.'" It is such a contract as may be completely performed within a year and
is not within this section. Brown v. Babcock, 265 App. Div. 596, 599, 40 N. Y. S. (2d)
428, 431 (4th Dep't 1943). Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N. Y. 439, 444,
164 N. E. 342, 344 (1928).
20. Rochester Folding Box Co. v. Browne, 55 App. Div. 444, 66 N. Y. Supp. 867 (4th
Dep't 1900), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 542, 71 N. E. 1139 (1904).
21. This emphasis on form, in the case of an oral contract which "by its ferms is not
to be performed within one year from the making thereof," does not seem to obtain as
strongly in the solution of those cases involving a companion provision of the Statute
of Frauds rendering unenforceable the oral promise of a surety or guarantor. N. Y. PErs.
PROP. LAW, § 31(2). In considering such a case, the Supreme Court has said: ". . . the
real character of a promise does not depend altogether upon the form of expression, but
largely on the situation of the parties; and the question always is, what the parties mutually understood by the language, whether they understood it to be a collateral or a direct
promise." Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479, 489 (1891). But see (1917) 2 CoRN. L. Q. 209.
22. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 499.
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A promise to serve two years if the promisor lives so long;

4. A promise to serve two years, but if the promisor dies the contract -hall be
terminated.
"It is obvious that all these promises have substantially the same meaning and,
if enforceable, the same legal effect; yet certainly the first promise, and presumably
the fourth, are within the statute, while certainly the second and presumably the
third are not."

The distinction is between a contract which must, by its terms, take more
than a year to perform but which may be defeated by a supervening contingency and one whose stated object can be fully performed within that time.
Even the Supreme Court has had difficulty in hewing accurately to so thin
a line. In Packet Conspany. v. Sickles23 the plaintiff contracted to install a
machine on a boat and he was to be paid for it out of the savings in fuel
realized during the remaining twelve-year life of the patent on the machine,
provided the boat should last that long. The court held that the destruction
of the boat before the expiration of the patent would be a supervening contingency causing a defeasance, not a completion of the contract, and declared
that the statute applied. ". . . the possibility of a defeasance does not make it
the less a contract not to be performed within the year."2 1 The statement as
quoted is a sound principle, but its misapplication in the Packet Company
case was recognized in the leading case of Warner v. Texas & Pacifid Railway,2 where justice Gray pointed out that the Packet Company contract
was by its terms to be limited alike by the life of the patent and by the life
of the boat. Both contingencies were stated in the contract, and the contemplated performance was not to extend beyond the happening of either of them.
"It is difficult to understand how the duration of the patent and the duration
of the boat differed from one another in their relation to the performance or
the determination of the contract; or how a contract to use an aid to navigation upon a boat, so long as she shall last, can be distinguished in principle
from a contract to support a man, so long as he shall live, which has been
often decided, and is generally admitted, not to be within the statute of
frauds. '20 Despite this rejection of its reasoning, the Packet Company opinion
is helpful to an understanding of the recent cases, to be discussed later, which
draw the distinction between defeasance and performance. Contrary to the
Supreme Court's holding in that case, it would appear that even though the
boat were to be destroyed, the contract would not have been breached, but
completed.
This view is taken in New York27- of a contract containing an option
23. 5 WalL Sso (U. S. 1866).
24. Id. at 595. Cf. Large v. Wire Wheel Corp. of Amer., 223 App. Div. 134, 227 N. Y.
Supp. 449 (4th Dep't 1928), aff'd, 250 N. Y. 531, 166 N. E. 312 (192S).
25. 164 U. S. 41S (1896).
26. Id. at 431.
27. But generally not elsewhere. Union Car Advertising Co. v. Boston Elevated Ry.
Co., 26 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928); Street v. Maddox, 24 F. (2d) 617 (App. D. C.,
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to terminate. A contract for services for one year commencing in the
future is not within the statute-if either party has an option to end it within
a year of its formation. 28 Nor is a contract for employment for an indefinite
term,°- nor a contract to refrain from a certain act, payment to continue as
long as the forbearance, 30 nor a contract to guarantee notes which matured
1
beyond one year but were subject to the right of prepayment at any time.
Contracts which as a matter of law, are terminable at will also escape the
statute despite the32 absence of any stated provision for termination ili the contracts themselves.
One more point may be briefly alluded to. In New York, a parol contract
for more than a year is not validated by part performance. Nothing less than
3
And of course
full performance by both parties takes it out of the statute.P
the possibility of performance within a year by one of the parties is insufficient
to make the contract good if a time exceeding a year is stipulated for performance by the other party.3
. In this brief review of the historical background we have noted (1) that
the statute applies to contracts which in terms or by necessary implication require that performance shall last for more than a year, (2) that the language
of the contract may be the deciding factor, (3) that in distinguishing between
performance and defeasance the New York courts construe as possible performance a contingency giving relief from further performance, if the contingency is mentioned in the contract. 5 With these points in mind, we may proceed to consider some of the more recent New York cases.
1928); Hanau v. Ehrlich [1912] A. C. 39; Meyer v. Roberts, 46 Ark. 80 (1885); Wag-

niere v. Dunnell, 29 R. I. 580, 73 Atl. 309 (1909).
28. Standard Bitulithic Co. v. Curran, 256 Fed. 68 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); Blake v. Voigt,
134 N. Y.69, 31 N. E. 256 (1892).
29. Fosner v. Precision Shapes, Inc., 271 App. Div. 435, 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 733 (1st

Dep't 1946); Rochester Folding Box Co. v. Browne, 55 App. Div- 444, 66 N. Y. Supp.
867 (4th Dep't 1900), aff'd. 179 N. Y. 542, 71 N. E. 1139 (1904).
30. Rague v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 164 App. Div. 126, 149 N. Y. Supp. 668
(2d Dep't 1914).
31. Reeve v. Cromwell, 227 App. Div. 32, 237 N. Y. Supp. 20 (1st Dep't 1929).

32. Contracts between attorney and client are, for reasons of public policy, terminable
at any time with or without cause. Such contracts therefore are outside this section of
the statute. In re Williams' Estate, 179 Misc. 805, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 741 (Surr. Ct, 1942);
Degen v. Steinbrink, 188 App. Div. 622, 177 N. Y. Supp. 226 (1st Dep't 1919)
33. Tyler v. Windeis, 186 App. Div. 698, 700, 174 N. Y. Supp. 762, 763 (1st Dep't 1919),
aff'd, 227 N. Y. 589, 125 N. E. 926 (1919); Wahl v. Barnum, 116 N. Y. 87, 98, 22 N. E.
280, 283 (1889). This view, though it appears to be the better reasoned, is not supported
sToX, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.
by the numerical weight of authority in this country. 2 W
1936) § 504.
34. Broadwell v. Getman, 2 Denio 87 (N. Y. 1846). In England the statute does not
apply in such a case provided it appears from the whole tenor of the agreement that It
is the intention of the parties that one party shall perform his obligation within the
year. 3 STpmI's Co

rNTAR'Es ON ra

LAWS OF ENGLAND

(19th ed., Cheshire 1928) 144.

35. In Radio Corp. of America v: Cable Radio Tube Corp., 66 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A.
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Sonie Recent New York Cases
The plaintiff in Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co$- had been engaged by defendant as a salesman. He alleged an oral contract whereby he was to receive a
commission on . . . all orders placed by ResolUte Paper Products Corp., at
any time, whether or not plaintiff was in defendant's employ at the time of
the placing of such orders. '37 The Appellate Division, reversing Special Term,
refused to allow the Statute of Frauds to be stricken out as a defense. The
Appellate Division pointed out that the obligation imposed upon the defendant was one which was to continue for an unlimited period of time, ". . . so
long as the defendant and Resolute Paper Products Corp. exist."3 3 The lastquoted wofds are those of the court, not of the contract. The contract as
alleged puts no period upon its term of operation; it simply says "at any time."
The case seems entirely sound. By any reasonable interpretation there was a
contract of permanent duration. It was not a contract to last for plaintiff's life,
or during the continuance of defendant's business, or for the existence of Resolute. It simply had no stated ending and might continue after ending of plaintiff's employment or his death. It was to that extent comparable to the contract
alleged in Pitkin v. Long Island R. R.Yr in which the plaintiff claimed that
the railroad had agreed, as a permanent arrangement, to stop its cars at a certain place. The contract was held to be unenforceable "... because, from the
nature and terms of the agreement, it was not to be performed by the company
within one year from the making thereof. 40 True, as in the Cohen case, the
railroad might have gone out of business within the year, but the language
of the contract provided for no such contingency. If and when it happened, it
would be a supervening excuse for non-performance not arising from the
contract at all.
There still remains the argument that Resolute might, within a year, have
ceased to place orders with Bartgis Brothers. Certainly there was no obligation on Resolute to place any, nor on defendant to accept them if placed.
No liability in favor of the plaintiff need necessarily have accrued after a year

from the making of the contract. Cannot this, therefore, be considered as a
contract capable of performance within a year? It is submitted that it cannot,
and that the court made no error in deciding that the statute applied. The

mere cessation of orders would not alter the contractual relationship between
plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff would still be in possession of his contractual

right, though the right might never have a monetary value. A contract which
2d, 1933), plaintiff's option to terminate was mentioned in the contract which, nevertheless, was held to be within the statute. However, the option was exerciable only if the
contract had already been breached by the defendant.
36.
47 N.
37.
38.
39.
40.

264 App. Div. 260, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 206 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 289 N. Y. 846,
E. (2d) 443 (1943).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
2 Barb. Ch. 221 (N. Y. 1847).
Id. at 232.
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has been fully performed on both sides is discharged;
therefore a contract
41
which is not discharged has not been performed.
The Cohen case appears to be in conflict with an earlier decision of the
Appellate Division, though of a different Department. In Hirsch v. Mcndclson 42 the plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, sued for commissions
on merchandise sold by the defendant, after the termination of plaintiff's employment, to customers obtained by the plaintiff during his employment.
He was an employee at will under an oral contract. It was held that
the statute was not a bar to this action. The facts appear to be indistinguishable from those of the Cohen case. As the latter case has the authority
of a Court of Appeals affirmance, even though without opinion, 43 the earlier
one can no longer be relied on.
In the month following the Appellate Division's decision in the Cohen case,
the same court decided Scanlan v. Henie.44 This was an appeal from a verdict
against Sonja Henie, who was alleged to have agreed orally to pay Scanlan,
her agent, as commissions, 20% of her earnings from the making of motion
pictures. The agreement was understood by the plaintiff to remain effective
as long as defendant was engaged in 'making motion pictures. In a three to
two decision the Appellate Division held that the contract did not come within
the statute. The majority wrote no opinion, but there was a dissenting opinion
by Justice Glennon in which Justice Martin concurred. The contract, as indicated in this opinion, was that if defendant made pictures at any time and
plaintiff were working as her manager, he would be entitled to a commission
on her earnings. The alleged right to commissions depended on the result of
plaintiff's efforts in arranging business contacts between the defendant and
motion picture producers. 45 His employment contract was of indefinite duration, and such a contract is not within the statute.4 The facts presented by
41. The continuing vitality of the contract but for the statute is emphasized by the
fact that it would, under the conditions supposed, be merely a contract calling for the payment of money by the defendant to the plaintiff upon the happening of a contingency,
namely, the placing of orders by Resolute. Presumably, therefore, it would still be assignable by the plaintiff. Assignability is, however, not a necessary factor in arriving at the
conclusion stated.
42. 243 App. Div. 705, 277 N. Y. Supp. 13 (2d Dep't 1935).
43. Affirmance without opinion, while an affirmance of the result, does not necessarily
constitute adoption of the reasoning used. But in commenting oxi the affirmance of the
Cohen case by the Court of Appeals, Swan, J., said in Droste v. Harry Atlas Sons, Inc.,
145 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944): "Although we cannot know that the Court of Ap-

peals adopted his (Justice Untermyer's) reasoning we can conceive of no other reasoning
which would lead to an affirmative answer to the question certified." However, the sentenEe loses some of its force in the light of the fact that Clark, J., dissented on the ground
that he interpreted the Court of Appeals' affirmance otherwise. The Droste case is more
fully discussed infra.

44. 264 App. Div. 913, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 844 (1st Dep't 1942).
45. See discussion of this case in Houston v. American Surety Co. of N. Y.,
-,

-

Misc.

57 N. Y. S. (2d) 290 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
46. Rochester Folding Box Co. v. Browne, 55 App. Div. 444, 66 N. Y. Supp. 867 (4th
Dep't 1900), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 542, 71 N. E. 1139 (1904).
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Justice Glennon in his dissent indicate that commissions would accrue only
47
from arrangements made by plaintiff while employed as defendant's manager
They would not necessarily accrue beyond the term of employment, nor would
defendant necessarily be even contingently liable for them beyond that term.
Defendant might, within a year, complete all the work plaintiff had arranged
for her, pay him off and end his employment. The contract between them
would thereupon have been performed and the contractual relationship dissolved.
45
the plaintiff alleged an oral
In the recent case of Elsfelder v. Cournand,
agreement with a Delaware corporation whose obligations under the agreement
were assumed by the defendant. The agreement was for the payment of
commissions and was terminable by either party on thirty days' notice, but
in the event of such termination the corporation was to remain obligated,
without limitation as to time, to continue to pay commissions on re-orders.
It was not shown that the life of the corporation was limited by its charter
or by the laws of Delaware. As the plaintiff had alleged a perpetual contract
with a perpetual corporation and claimed that its liability under it was to be
perpetual, the court can hardly be criticized for finding that the agreement,
according to the intention of the parties as expressed by the contract, could
not be fully performed within a year.
The Cohen case was referred to in Deuicht v. Storper 2 in which plaintiff
alleged that defendant had agreed to employ him as long as defendant "... . continued to employ workers trained, developed and gathered by plaintiff." He
further alleged that he had been discharged by defendant who had nevertheless continued to employ such workers. The court held that the statute did
not apply because it could have been performed within a year had defendant discharged within that time all the employees trained by plaintiff. The
decision appears entirely sound. In Griffin v. Frank J. Guigan Inc. 0° defendant orally agreed to pay plaintiff 5% commission on the gross amount of any
contracts defendant should thereafter obtain from the United States Government. The court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
correctly following the Cohen case.
However, Houston v. American Surety Co. of New Fork"I appears to be a
misapplication of the Cohen doctrine. Plaintiff alleges an oral agreement whereby defendant was to pay plaintiff $5000 a year as salary "... . for so long as
the plaintiff shall live and continue in the service of the defendant" in con47. ".... plaintiff was asked, 'So then if Miss Henie made a picture say in 1936 and
another one in 1937, you would get commissions on both of those two, according to
your understanding, is that right?' To this question he replied, 'That's right. But I would
be her manager, I would be working."' Scanlan v. Henie, 264 App. Div. 913, 35 N. Y.
S. (2d) 844 (1st Dep't 1942).
48. 270 App. Div. 162, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 34 (1st Dep't 1945).
49. - Misc. -, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 350 (N. Y. City Ct. 1943).
50. N. Y. L. J. Jan. 20, 1944, p. 251, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.).
51. - Misc -, 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 290 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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sideration of plaintiff's delivery of a telegraphic code to defendant. The court
declared that the defendant could not terminate the contract at will and that
under the Cohen case defendant's continued liability brought the case within
the statute. It is submitted that either of the alternatives in the contract as
,quoted above would take it out of the statute. The liability extends at most
up to plaintiff's death, and the Cohen case does not apply.
.Jones v. Demuth Glass Works; Inc.U2 concerned an oral agreement for an

exclusive distribution agency. By express stipulation, it was to last as long
as both parties continued in business. In .distinguishing the Cohen case, the
Justice. at Special Term said:
"Iti precisely because the dontingency of retiring from business could only
be a supervening event and was not provided by its terms that the agreement
in Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co.

. .

. was not saved thereby."

A close question was presented in the very recent case of Hooke v. Petroleum

fleat and Power Co.53 The plaintiff's contract Vas for commissions on all sales
made to customers obtained by him ". . : as long as defendant continued to

make such sales.". The employment contract was terminable by either party
at any time.' This fact, however, appears fo have been without significance
in the case, as plaintiff was suing only for commissions on sales made after
hQ left defendant's employ. His right to these commissions therefore could
n6t be said to depend upon the duration of his employment. The court held
that under the Cohen and Elsfelder decisions the defendant's obligation would
b. of indefinite duration and that the statute was a good defense. It is sub.
:mitted that the form of the contract differs sufficiently from those in the
cases relied on to take the case out of the statute. Defendant's liability was
to'last not perpetually, but only as long as such sales continued. If and when
they stopped, the contract would have been performed according to its terns.
In the Cohen case, such terms were not present. We have already seen that
'two contracts identical in intent and save for the statute, in their legal consequences, need not be affected in the same way by the statute. Here even a
difference of intent may be -discerned, though actually it is the difference in
language that controls. The parties in the Hooke case intended that the contractual relationship should not survive the cessation of orders. Whether or
not orders had, at any particular point, ceased, is a question for the trier of
the facts. Presumably if they had stopped for a reasonable time, the contract
would have been performed. From that point on, the possibility of 'their resumption would not maintain the contractual relationship, and the fact of their
resumption would not revive it.
The difficulties considered in this comment have perplexed the Federal
courts as well as those of New York. Drosto %,rHarry Atlas Sons, Ine.64 pre52. N. Y. L. J., Feb. 21, 1946, p. 720, col. S !(Sup.. Ct. Kings Co.). Accord. 11. 3. Mc..
1
Grath Co. v. Marchant, 117 Md. 472, 83 At. 912 (19t2).
53. N. Y. L. J., May 2, 1946, p. 1720, col. 2 Sup. Ct., N. X. Co.).
54. 145 F. (2d) 899 C. C. A. 2d, 1944). A petition for rehearing was denied with equal
reluctance. 147 F. (2d) 675 (C.C. A.'2d, 1945).
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sents a case analogous to the Cohen case. It involved an agreement for the
payment to the plaintiff of commissions on all orders defendant might obtain
at any time from any agency of the United States Government. Plaintiff acted
as defendant's agent in obtaining one contract, but the commissions were to
be paid on subsequent business &s well. The court held the contract to be unenforceable under the statute, but remarked that a different result would have
been reached had it not been for the Cohen case which, under Eric Rzilroad
Co. v. Tompkins ' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was bound to follow.
Judge Clark in a strong dissent, viewed the matter as a procedural one. He
suggested that the New York Court of Appeals in affirming the Cohen decision
may merely have desired to avoid striking out the -defense of the statute befor6 trial in order not to foreclose a defense which the proof might have shown
to be pertinent. It is true that in some cases in which the facts of the contract have been in questiono the courts have refused to grant summary judgment. But the problem is broader than one of procedure. Extreme niceties
appear in cases based on undisputed facts, and are hardly to be avoided. The
Cohen decision appears sound as a substantive matter, and the difficulties it
raises must sooner or later be squarely faced.
Conclusion
The difficulties are practical ones. The cases deal with oral contracts whose
exact terms are provable only by witnesses subject to the usual rigors of crossexamination. The most the courts can do is to lay down a rule as to what
must be proved, leaving questions of fact to the triers of fact, as always. A
definitive statement of the rule, though it would not and could not eliminate difficulties of proof, would at least lighten the difficulties of pleading
which gave rise to many of the cases discussed here. Whatever the rule, the
public could guide itself accordingly.
The distinction to which the cases point is apparently between the possible continuance beyond a year of a liability, and the continuance beyond a
year of a possible liability. The first is exemplified by the Scan!an case, thu
second by the Cohen case. The possibility that the promisor's liability will
continue beyond a year will not bring the contract within the statute if the
contract's terms include an event which may within that time end the contractual relationship. That is the Scanlan case. On the other hand, if the contract's terms require that the relationship shall last beyond a year it is within
the statute even though the continuing liability to which the promisor is subject thereafter is merely a contingent one. That is the Cohen case. That the
promisor's liability must endure, though it be but contingent, is the deciding
factor.
55. 304 U. S. 64 (1933).
56. High v. Pritzker, 269 App. Div. 1015, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 57 (lst Dep't 1945); cf.
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 263 App. Div. 770, 49 N. Y'. S. (2d) 166, (1st Dcpt 1944), leave
to appeal denied 263 App. Div. 843 (1st Dep't 1944). The case is disvusd in the Drosle
opinion on rehearing, 147 F. (2d) 675, 676 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).

